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Jaksa Penuntut Umum Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) menuntut terdakwa dalam kasus dugaan suap pembangunan Pembangkit Listrik

Jaksa Penuntut Umum Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) menuntut terdakwa dalam kasus dugaan suap pembangunan Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Uap (PLTU) 1.000 megawatt di Tarahan, Lampung, pada tahun 2004 lalu , Izedrik Emir Moeis, dengan pidana penjara selama empat tahun enam bulan. Menurut Jaksa Supardi, politikus PDI Perjuangan itu dianggap terbukti telah menerima suap USD423.985 dalam pembangunan enam bagian PLTU Tarahan. "Menuntut, supaya majelis hakim telah menjatuhkan pidana penjara kepada terdakwa Izedrik Emir Moeis selama empat tahun enam bulan dikurangi masa tahanan," jelas Jaksa Supardi saat membacakan tuntutan Emir, di Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Tipikor), Jakarta, Senin (10/3/2014). Jaksa Supardi juga telah menuntut Emir dengan pidana denda sebesar Rp200 juta. Apabila tidak dibayar, maka mantan Ketua KomiI XI DPR itu harus menjalani pidana kurungan selama lima bulan. Sebelumnya, Emir didakwa telah menerima suap lebih dari USD423.985 berikut bunga dari Alstom Power Incorporated (Amerika Serikat) dan memenangkan konsorsium Alstom Inc., Marubeni Corporation (Jepang), dan PT Alstom Energy System (Indonesia) dalam pembangunan enam bagian PLTU Tarahan melalui Presiden Direktur Pacific Resources Inc., Pirooz Muhammad Sharafih. Atas tindakannya, Emir diduga bertentangan dengan kewajiban sebagai anggota DPR yang membidangi energi,sumber daya mineral, riset dan teknologi serta lingkungan hidup.

saco-indonesia.com, Fungsi Lemari Arsip Fungsi Lemari Arsip. Keseriusan dalam pengelolaan file dan arsip di kantor juga sa

saco-indonesia.com,

Fungsi Lemari Arsip

Fungsi Lemari Arsip. Keseriusan dalam pengelolaan file dan arsip di kantor juga sangatlah penting untuk dapat menghindari kerusakan yang mungkin dapat terjadi kapan saja. Kepastian bahwa dokumen perusahaan anda sudah dalam penanganan yang baik sangatlah penting untuk kelangsungan pekerjaan berjalan dengan lancar. Arsip yang bertumpuk di meja kerja juga sangat mengganggu aktifitas pekerjaan sehingga dapat memperlambat produktifitas karyawan dalam mengerjakan pekerjaannya.

Untuk itulah sangat diperlukan adanya sebuah lemari arsip yang mampu untuk menampung semua file arsip yang ada sehingga tidak lagi berserakan di atas meja kerja. Lemari tempat penyimpanan arsip ini telah terdiri dari rak-rak yang bertingkat. Setiap tingkatan rak juga dapat ditempatkan arsip-arsip sesuai dengan urutan tanggal ataupun urutan nama file tersebut. Penyusunan yang rapi dapat memudahkan pencarian ketika hendak digunakan kembali sehingga tidak membuang-buang waktu dalam pencarian.

Lemari arsip yang digunakan untuk dapat menyimpan arsip dan dokumen penting perusahaan juga berfungsi sebagai tempat perlindungan dari ancaman kerusakan yang berasal dari lingkungan sekitar seperti bahaya kebakaran. Lemari ini mampu untuk menahan panas yang ditimbulkan oleh api sehingga tidak membakar file dan dokumen yang tersimpan di dalamnya.

Terbuat dari bahan plat metal yang berkualitas serta dapat dilindungi oleh lapisan cat yang tahan air sehingga terhindar dari ancaman keropos yang diakibatkan karena berkarat. Mampu menjaga arsip dalam waktu yang lama bahkan sampai bertahun-tahun tidak mengalami kerusakan yang berarti untuk dapat dipergunakan kembali.

Kemampuan lemari arsip untuk dapat menyimpan dokumen penting perusahaan juga merupakan kebutuhan yang paling utama dan sangat vital. Pengorganisasian semua file yang dimiliki perusahaan sangat membantu sekali dalam urusan surat menyurat karena memudahkan dalam pencarian kembali file-file yang telah lama tersimpan.

Waktu dan tenaga yang bisa dihemat memberikan kemampuan karyawan untuk bekerja lebih baik lagi dan bisa lebih dioptimalkan produktifitasnya. Kalau semua terorganisir dengan baik maka perusahaan pun akan semakin berkembang dengan baik dan menghasilkan keuntungan yang sudah pasti akan meningkat juga karena kelancaran administrasi sudah terjamin tidak akan berantakan lagi. Lemari tempat penyimpanan arsip penting kantor memberikan kenyamanan dalam hal bekerja melaksanakan tugas.


Editor : Dian Sukmawati

Ms. Plisetskaya, renowned for her fluidity of movement, expressive acting and willful personality, danced on the Bolshoi stage well into her 60s, but her life was shadowed by Stalinism.

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

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