Genset Foton Murah di Humbang Hasundutan Hubungi : 0821 - 1310 - 3112/(021) 9224 - 2423 PT. Tribuana Diesel Adalah penjualan Generating-Set (genset) berkualitas import (builtup) bagi anda yang membutuhkan product berkualitas serta pengadaan yang cepat urgent tanpa berbelit-belit, Genset kami di lengkapi dengan dokumen Certificate Of Original , Manual book engine dan manual book generator, Kami sediakan Genset kapasitas 10 Kva - 650Kva (ANDA PESAN KAMI ANTAR).

Genset Foton Murah di Humbang Hasundutan Kami juga menerima pembuatan box silent dan perakitan diesel generator set. Produk kami meliputi berbagai diesel generator set model open, silent lokal yang ukuranya menyesuaikan lokasi pondasi genset, mobile/ trailer . Sebagian besar mesin kami menggunakan Merk : Perkins, Cummins, Deutz, Lovol, Isuzu Foton dengan generator Leroy Somer, Stamford, kualitas terbaik brushless alternator. Genset Foton Murah di Humbang Hasundutan

Genset Foton Murah di Humbang Hasundutan

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Jual Genset Lovol | Genset Foton Murah di Humbang Hasundutan | Jual Genset Lovol kav 45 kva | jual genset lovol Kap 70 Kva Prime Power type 1004TG | Genset Lovol | Genset Lovol kav 45 kva | Jual Genset cummins |

Jual GENSET CUMMINS 10 KVA - 1000 KVA Type Open Dan Silent bergaransi dan berkualitas di Banjarmasin

Jual GENSET CUMMINS 10 KVA - 1000 KVA Type Open Dan Silent bergaransi dan berkualitas di Banjarmasin Hubungi : 0821 - 1310 - 3112/(021) 9224 - 2423 PT. Tribuana Diesel Adalah penjualan Generating-Set (genset) berkualitas import (builtup) bagi anda yang membutuhkan product berkualitas serta pengadaan yang cepat urgent tanpa berbelit-belit, Genset kami di lengkapi dengan dokumen Certificate Of Original , Manual book engine dan manual book generator, Kami sediakan Genset kapasitas 10 Kva - 650Kva (ANDA PESAN KAMI ANTAR). Jual GENSET CUMMINS 10 KVA - 1000 KVA Type Open Dan Silent bergaransi dan berkualitas di Banjarmasin

saco-indonesia.com, Pada zaman cyber seperti saat ini, kebutuhan akan data sangatlah penting bagi kita. Dengan data, kita dapat melakukan berbag

Pada zaman cyber seperti saat ini, kebutuhan akan data sangatlah penting bagi kita. Dengan data, kita dapat melakukan berbagai hal yang dapat membuat perkembangan teknologi semakin maju. Jadi sudah selayaknya data yang dimiliki dijaga dengan baik dan harus benar-benar dalam kondisi yang aman. Bahkan kalau di dunia IT, data merupakan sesuatu yang dapat membuat suatu lembaga atau perusahaan menjadi berkembang dan sangat maju. Contohnya saja seperti perusahaan search engine terbesar layaknya google.com . Perusahaan satu ini menyimpan atau pun mengindex cukup banyak data yang ada di dunia ini sehingga dapat membawa mereka menjadi pepuler dengan menyandang predikat mesin pencari terbaik dan terlengkap. Jadi tidak bisa dipungkiri, data memang sangatlah penting.

Cara Mudah Kunci Flashdisk Tanpa Software atau Aplikasi

Cara Mudah Kunci Flashdisk Tanpa Software atau
Aplikasi Pictures

Oleh karena itu, kami disini akan sedikit memberikan tips yang baik untuk menjaga data flashdisk anda dengan cara menguncinya menggunakan password. Namun, cara ini cukup mudah dikarenakan tidak perlu menggunakan software atau pun aplikasi lain yang ada. Cukup dengan mengikuti beberapa langkah nya.
Namun yang perlu di ingat, fitur password untuk mengunci flashdisk ini tidak dimiliki oleh semua Operating System. Salah satu Operating System yang memiliki fitur password untuk flashdisk ini adalah windows 7. Pada windows 7, fitur ini dinamakan dengan bitlocker. Jadi, kami akan membahas bagaimana caranya mengunci flasdisk anda dengan menggunakan password pada windows 7.

Langkah-langkah nya adalah sebagai berikut.

  • Buka windows explorer
  • Kemudian klik kanan pada drive flashdisk anda dan pilih Turn On Bitlocker
  • Jika sudah keluar botton check box, maka centang lah pada bagian Use a Password to unlock the drive
  • Masukkan password anda pada kotak type your password dan masukkan kembali password nya pada kotak Retype your password
  • Klik save the recovery key to a file dan klik save untuk menyimpannya
  • Klik next
  • Untuk memulai proses pemberian password pada flashdisknya, langsung klik start encrypting
  • Tunggulah sampai proses nya selesai dan jika berhasil, Icon drive flashdisk akan berubah dengan adanya gambar gembok
  • Coba uji flashdisk anda dengan mencolokkannya pada laptop, jika berhasil maka ia akan meminta password untuk membuka flashdisk tersebut

saco-indonesia.com, Satu rumah di Perumahan Mega Sentul  Blok Alamada Jl. Aster, RT.002/08, Desa Pasir Laja, Kecamatan Suka

saco-indonesia.com, Satu rumah di Perumahan Mega Sentul  Blok Alamada Jl. Aster, RT.002/08, Desa Pasir Laja, Kecamatan Sukaraja, Rabu malam telah digerebek oleh Tim Densus 88 Anti Teror.  Dalam penggrebekan tersebut seorang anggota yang terduga teroris jaringan Abu Roban telah diamankan bersama tiga penghuni lainnya

Terduga teroris itu Saduloh Rojak yang berusia 40 tahun, sebagai pemilik rumah, sedangkan tiga lainnya  Sibgotulloh,19, Achmad Jayabrata,22, dan Sayan Hibatulloh,19 adalah tamunya saat penggerebekan berlangsung. Selain itu  tim Densus juga telah   menyita cairan bahan kimia seember seberat 25 kg, pistol air softgun, senjata tajam dan senjata yang berbentuk pulpen serta sejumlah buku jihad.

Ketua RW 08 Desa Pasir Laja Nurrahman, telah mengatakan tidak ada perlawanan saat  penggerebekan. terjadi  “Sekitar pkl.18:30, lima anggota Densus 88 tersebut datang ke rumah saya dan meyerahkan surat izin penangkapan di Blok Alamada Jl. Aster,” katanya.

Menurutnya, penggrebekan tersebut telah berlangung sangat cepat dan Tim Densus telah membawa sejumlah barang bukti dari rumah Saduloh Rojak. “Usai mengerebek rumah Saduloh di Blok Alamada, Tim Densus juga telah menggerebek rumah istri keduanya di  RT.003/05 di perumahan yang sama. Tim Densus juga sempat memeriksa Ny. Sifa, istri pertama Saduloh,” katanya.

Dia juga telah menyebutkan, selama ini Saduloh juga jarang bergaul, tapi rajin salat di majid di  dalam kompleks. “Tapi belakangan ini dia jarang salat ke masjid. Kami tidak tahu pasti pekerjaanya, dia juga sering berangkat kerja pagi, siang dan malam. Tidak seperti pegawai biasa yang berangkat pagi dan pulang sore atau malam,” katanya.

Editor : Dian Sukmawati

The career criminals in genre novels don’t have money problems. If they need some, they just go out and steal it. But such financial transactions can backfire, which is what happened back in 2004 when the Texas gang in Michael

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

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